Powering through war: Ukraine’s energy transition is taking place amid an invasion

Ukraine’s energy system has been badly damaged by the Russian invasion, with energy generation infrastructure becoming a target of late. But efforts to improve the country’s level of low-carbon generation are underway and plans are afoot to build back better

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has gutted the country’s power system, wrecking transmission and destroying thermal power plants. Since 2022, the country’s energy sector has been going through cycles of destruction and repair, with a recent spate of attacks on thermal power plants knocking the majority of capacity offline.

But the war is not being seen as a reason to stop the energy transition—in fact, many see the transition as a way to improve the country’s resilience as it rebuilds and prepares for a future aligned with the European Union.

“What I am personally witnessing is a significant advancement in both discussions and actionable steps on the energy transition since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” says Ievgeniia Kopytsia, a Ukrainian lawyer specialising in environmental, climate and energy law.

“This can be attributed to two primary factors: firstly, the deliberate targeting of our energy infrastructure by Russian forces, which has highlighted the urgent need for a more resilient and diversified energy system, and secondly, the acceleration of EU accession talks,” she adds.

Ukraine was already tackling its energy transition before the Russian invasion. Traditionally, it got half of its power from nuclear sources and most of the rest from thermal power plants, largely coal, and hydropower. In the 2010s, a boom in renewable energy generation was seen. Between 2015 and 2021, solar capacity increased from less than one gigawatt (GW) to 6.4 GW, while wind jumped from 0.4 GW to 1.6 GW.

But the war has affected much of the country’s power generation. In 2022, the Russian military captured the country’s largest nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia, and destroyed much of the country’s renewable energy capacity. Then, in 2023, the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant was also attacked, causing major environmental damage.

WINTER UNCERTAINTY

The destruction of Ukraine’s thermal capacity marks a change in Russian military tactics, from targeting transmission and distribution lines to hitting generation. The efficiency of the attacks is also much higher than it was previously, said Maxim Timchenko of Ukrainian energy company DTEK at a press briefing in May 2024.

“Thermal generation and hydro generation have such a high concentration of capacity at one power station [they’re] an easy target for Russians,” he added.

The attacks reduced DTEK’s thermal generation capacity from 5 GW to just 450 megawatts (MW) on May 13th. The damage is causing blackouts across the country and many are worrying over how Ukraine will get through the winter when energy demand increases significantly.

“Today [May 14th] in Ukraine, if it stays as it is, and we do not have further attacks, half of the capacity for our winter season is absent,” Timchenko added.

ROLE OF WIND

Wind energy is attractive for Ukraine because, while projects have longer lead times, generation will be higher in the winter than the summer, which better aligns with demand peaks than solar, says Stubbe. In general, he sees the war as a driver for more renewables.

Alongside new gas power generation, DTEK is also looking to add renewables to help increase the country’s generation capacity. Ukraine already has wind power production from the Tyligulska wind farm, around 100 kilometres from the frontline. It currently has a capacity of 114 MW from 19 turbines, with an annual electricity production of 3.9 terawatt-hours—enough to supply energy to 200,000 homes.
An investment of €450 million will add a further 384 MW of capacity to the site, produced by 64 turbines. Overall, the wind farm is expected to generate enough electricity to power 900,000 homes and cut carbon emissions by 1.7 million tonnes per year when completed.

“Renewables are an energy source that’s domestic, that reduces dependence from imports from countries including Russia. It’s also an energy source that’s more decentralised, so harder to attack. So there’s an understanding that decarbonisation and energy security go hand in hand,” Stubbe adds.

SECURITY OF SOLAR


Solar power is also less vulnerable to the war as it is decentralised, says Boehling.  In a recent study, Greenpeace argues that just 1% of the suitable land for solar and wind can supply Ukraine’s entire electricity demand. Ahead of the recovery conference in Berlin, it is calling for a larger focus on building out renewables in the country and wants a  “Solar Marshall Plan” to emphasise the scale and potential.

“With the current energy crisis, it becomes very clear that the support needs to be far bigger, faster and more strategic. In the current situation, solar is very fast, very cheap, and very easy to install. And, by the way, very resilient to the war,” says Boehling.

While Greenpeace’s mapping may seem too ambitious, Kopytsia says a renewable rollout in Ukraine is crucial for the country’s energy transition and security goals, and can showcase how important the technology is to the global energy transition.

“Ramping up renewables must be the core for the energy transition and ensuring energy security. Once we go from the centralised to decentralised, locally generated power, we can ensure that, no matter what, we have the primarily local needs being met,” she adds.

ENDURING BLACKOUTS


Due to attacks on its energy system, Ukraine has witnessed power outages throughout the war. This has meant that decentralised power is crucial to keeping critical infrastructure running, and solar panels with battery storage are often preferable to diesel generators.

“Next winter, we’ll again see hundreds of thousands of diesel generators in place at critical infrastructure, schools, hospitals, companies and private houses. But the diesel is expensive, and these generators are loud and pollute the air,” Boehling explains, adding that it can be hard to transport diesel to some areas and the security of its supply is a concern.

Ukrainian environmental organisations and international partners support the effort to roll out solar and storage capacity. Projects are in place at schools and hospitals, including a 30-kilowatt solar power plant at Boryslav Hospital, which came online in January 2024 and will provide up to 35% of the electricity it needs to operate.

Second-hand solar panels are also being sent to the country. For instance, from the UK, the London borough of Hammersmith & Fulham donated 730 previously-used solar panels, checked by the University of Exeter, to an Intensive Care Hospital in Kremenchuk, where Russian forces hit a shopping mall in 2022. Meanwhile, a group in Colorado, in the US, has sent over 100 solar panels to Ukraine.

“Solar plus batteries is an economically attractive solution for mitigating these outages in comparison to diesel generators. Of course, the investment cost is much higher, but if you have to run diesel generators a lot, the fuel cost actually adds up, and it is as expensive or even more expensive than the solution with solar and batteries,” says Stubbe.

He adds that the solar rollout has happened “to some extent” for critical and social infrastructure, while there is anecdotal evidence that some households purchased and installed solar power.

SHORT TERM

While renewables are key to Ukraine’s energy transition and security, they also challenge the country’s inflexible grid. This means they need to be matched with other technology, like batteries and dispatchable sources.

“We all would want to see large-scale installations of renewables, but at the moment, I think there is an urgent need for at least two to three gigawatts of a fleet of small gas turbines or gas generators across the country to help balance the system,” says Stubbe.

A study by Berlin Economics shows that Ukraine could more than double its total installed solar capacity and increase wind capacity by five times by 2030, up to 14 GW and 12 GW, respectively. This is economically and technically feasible if flexibility from storage and gas is provided.

Stubbe explains that some solar investors see no business model in adding solar without storage to the grid. Even with storage, it is difficult because of Ukraine’s heavily regulated energy markets and subsidised energy prices. The country is also looking at tariff reform, which could then help the business case.